III. Objections

112. Against this way, which makes ‘to desire’ the act of hope [nn.89-90], there are multiple arguments.

The first is as follows: someone who despairs desires beatitude (and the proof is that he is saddened by the loss of beatitude); but no one is saddened save by the loss of something either loved or desired; he who despairs desires then, and does not hope;     therefore etc     .

113. Besides, I can love someone in himself with love of friendship and can desire the good for him; but I love no one in himself unless I wish good for him; therefore if any good intelligible in itself is loved with charity, a good is desired for him with charity; therefore in the same person a good present and absent is desired, from the authority of Augustine On the Trinity 11.12 n.18; therefore ‘to desire’ is not ‘to hope’.

114. Besides beatitude is naturally desired, as is plain from Augustine ibid. 13.5 n.8; so no supernatural virtue is needed for this.

115. Further, if hope is a virtue inclining one to desire, then ‘to desire’, which is the act of it, can be meritorious in the precise sense, since it is a theological virtue; but no act is meritorious unless elicited or commanded by charity; therefore ‘to desire’ will be elicited and commanded by charity. If it is elicited I have the conclusion intended, that hope will then be charity; if it is commanded, then charity commands as soon as hope elicits, and both are acts of the will for you [n.110]; therefore the will will have two acts at the same time about the same object, which seems unacceptable.